Zephyr's DNS resolver (subsys/net/lib/dns) parses resource records from DNS responses in dns_unpack_answer(), which validated only the fixed RR header (type, class, TTL, rdlength) and accepted any at…
Medium CVSS 4.8
Summary
Zephyr's DNS resolver (subsys/net/lib/dns) parses resource records from DNS responses in dns_unpack_answer(), which validated only the fixed RR header (type, class, TTL, rdlength) and accepted any attacker-declared rdlength, including one extending past the end of the received datagram. The TXT and SRV consumers in dns_validate_record() (resolve.c) then read up to rdlength bytes (clamped only to a record-type maximum such as DNS_MAX_TEXT_SIZE, default 64, not to the packet) from the receive buf…
In-depth triage · Auto channel
No in-depth report has been generated yet (DR-003 v2 AI pipeline is under construction).
Affected products
- :
Sources
- NVD DATABASE
Original Links
- https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/commit/58b46c81c6796dac4dc7391f32ba006474f94dc8 Patch
- https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/security/advisories/GHSA-3jxq-xx8g-q8j2 Exploit
- https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/security/advisories/GHSA-3jxq-xx8g-q8j2 Exploit
Timeline
- nvd_ingest NVD