Headroom's LLM proxy derives the memory owner from the x-headroom-user-id request header. The header is read directly at several points in headroom/proxy/handlers/openai.py, including the chat comple…
严重 CVSS 9.1
摘要
Headroom's LLM proxy derives the memory owner from the x-headroom-user-id request header. The header is read directly at several points in headroom/proxy/handlers/openai.py, including the chat completion and websocket paths, and nothing binds the value to the caller. A client can therefore name another user's identifier and read or write that user's stored LLM memory. The fix introduces a single resolve_memory_identity seam in headroom/proxy/identity.py that honors the header only for loopback …
中文摘要建设中,暂以英文摘要呈现(DR-003 v2)。
深度研判
该漏洞尚未生成深度研判报告(DR-003 v2 AI pipeline 建设中)。
数据来源
- NVD DATABASE
原始链接
- https://github.com/headroomlabs-ai/headroom
- https://github.com/headroomlabs-ai/headroom/blob/v0.29.0/headroom/proxy/handlers/openai.py
- https://github.com/headroomlabs-ai/headroom/blob/v0.36.1/headroom/proxy/identity.py
- https://github.com/headroomlabs-ai/headroom/pull/2207
- https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/headroom-proxy-treats-the-client-supplied-x-headroom-user-id-header-as-an-authenticated-identity
时间线
- nvd_ingest NVD