Dockge validates a stack name only on the write path. In backend/stack.ts the allow-list check in validate(), which requires the name to match ^[a-z0-9_-]+$, is reached from save() alone, while the p…
高危 CVSS 8.8
摘要
Dockge validates a stack name only on the write path. In backend/stack.ts the allow-list check in validate(), which requires the name to match ^[a-z0-9_-]+$, is reached from save() alone, while the path getter returns path.join(this.server.stacksDir, this.name) and Stack.getStack builds path.join(server.stacksDir, stackName) with no check. The socket handlers in backend/agent-socket-handlers/docker-socket-handler.ts confirm the caller is logged in and that the name is a string, then pass it str…
中文摘要建设中,暂以英文摘要呈现(DR-003 v2)。
深度研判
该漏洞尚未生成深度研判报告(DR-003 v2 AI pipeline 建设中)。
数据来源
- NVD DATABASE
原始链接
- https://github.com/louislam/dockge
- https://github.com/louislam/dockge/blob/1.5.0/backend/agent-socket-handlers/docker-socket-handler.ts#L43-L78
- https://github.com/louislam/dockge/blob/1.5.0/backend/stack.ts#L155-L157
- https://github.com/louislam/dockge/blob/1.5.0/backend/stack.ts#L218-L232
- https://github.com/louislam/dockge/blob/1.5.0/backend/stack.ts#L377-L379
- https://github.com/louislam/dockge/issues/994
- https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/dockge-path-traversal-via-unvalidated-stack-name-allows-arbitrary-compose-and-env-disclosure-and-arbitrary-directory-deletion
时间线
- nvd_ingest NVD